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 Explaining rising regionalism and failing multilateralism: 











The beleaguered progress of the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO presents 
something of a puzzle for economic theory: if multilateralism is an effective forum for 
liberalisation (as it has been in the past), then why have the current round of talks 
faltered amid the proliferation of preferential trade negotiations? Several authors have 
argued that the consensus decision-making and single-undertaking principles of the 
WTO have lead to coordination failures amongst an increasingly expanded and diverse 
membership which has caused frustrated WTO members to form PTAs. This paper 
constructs a formal model which shows that the combination of the single-undertaking 
and consensus decision-making principles with an expanded and more diverse 
membership can lead to more than just coordination failure; it can render multilateralism 
less desirable for some parties than bilateralism. It is argued that these principles give 
countries de facto veto power meaning that their threat point during multilateral 
negotiations is a reversion to bilateral negotiations between all parties. Accordingly, 
countries with relatively less to gain from multilateralism can use their veto power to 
extract gains from those that would benefit substantially from the WTO. If an expanding 
membership has increased the number of such countries, then the benefits of 
multilateralism versus regionalism from the perspective of their negotiating partners 
may have been diminished to such an extent that they are no longer willing to wait for 
the conclusion of the Doha round before engaging in regional negotiations. This result 
adds credence to the idea that ‘variable geometry’ be introduced into the WTO system, 
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  11 Introduction 
 
The beleaguered progress of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) presents something of a puzzle for economic theory: if multilateral 
trade negotiations are an effective forum for liberalisation (as has been the case 
historically), then why have the current round of talks struggled amid the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs)? Numerous authors have posited that this recent 
phenomenon may in part be precipitated by the combination of the specific decision-
making process of the WTO and the fact that the current membership of the WTO is 
larger and more diverse than it was during previous rounds.
2 Two features of WTO 
jurisprudence underpin this diagnosis: the requirement that WTO decision-making be 
formed by consensus; and the single-undertaking principle. The combination of these 
two elements means that all aspects of a WTO negotiating round must be acceptable to 
all WTO members before the round can be concluded. Accordingly, it is argued that 
reaching unanimous decisions amongst an expanded and more diverse membership will 
inevitably be frustrated by coordination failure. 
 
It is the contention of this paper that the combination of the single-undertaking and 
consensus decision-making principles with an expanded and more diverse membership 
can lead to more than just coordination failure; it can render multilateralism less 
desirable for some parties than bilateralism. This contention is based on the fact that the 
single-undertaking and consensus decision-making principles ensure that bargaining in 
the WTO is multilateral in nature, i.e. it involves the maximisation of a single Nash 
bargaining product rather than the maximisation of bilateral Nash bargaining products as 
would occur via PTA negotiation. Thus, the threat point of each country during 
multilateral bargaining is a reversion to bilateral bargaining between all parties. 
Accordingly, multilateral bargaining affords great power to countries that have less to 
gain from multilateralism relative to bilateralism. This point is emphasised by an  1 N +  
                                                 
2 For examples see: Jackson (1998), Schott and Watal (2000), Steinberg (2002), Sutherland et al. (2004) 
and Ehlermann and Ehring (2005). 
  2country endowment model in which one large ‘hub’ country deals with N smaller 
‘spoke’ countries. It is found that, the greater the number of spoke countries that 
participate in multilateral bargaining, the lower the relative benefit of multilateral 
bargaining for the hub country. Given that WTO negotiations take longer to conclude 
than PTA negotiations, over-accession can occur, whereby the hub country does not gain 
enough from multilateralism to make it worth the wait. Accordingly, it is possible that 
rising regionalism and failing multilateralism could be explained thus: the recent 
expansion of WTO membership to include numerous small countries, in combination 
with the nature of multilateral bargaining facilitated by the single-undertaking and 
consensus decision-making principles, has eroded the gains from negotiating via the 
WTO relative to bilateralism from the perspective of larger countries. This analysis adds 
credence to suggestions, made by Sutherland et al. (2004) and Lawrence (2006) amongst 
others, that some form of ‘variable geometry’ be considered within the WTO framework 
in which a hybrid of multilateral and plurilateral negotiations take place. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides more detail on the difference 
between multilateral and bilateral negotiations in the current context. Section 3 outlines 
the basic model. In section 4 multilateral and bilateral negotiations are formally 
modelled. Section 5 utilises numerical simulations to assess the welfare differences 
between the two negotiating forums when WTO membership expands. Section 6 
provides a discussion of the implications of these results. 
 
2  The difference between WTO and PTA negotiations  
 
The dominant theoretical approach to the logic underpinning trade agreements, 
epitomised in the work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002), posits that trade 
agreements facilitate avenues of escape from terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemmas 
that arise when countries with market power engage in optimal-tariff setting. Thus, trade 
agreements represent the outcome of bargaining games between countries over self-
enforcing tariff combinations. However, this approach does not in itself explain why 
  3countries would choose to engage in multilateral trade liberalisation let alone why an 
institution such as the WTO is required to mediate the process. Accordingly, in order to 
highlight the distinction between negotiating in the WTO and negotiating a web of 
bilateral PTAs, it is necessary to provide explanations of these two issues. 
 
2.1 Multilateral  versus  bilateral bargaining 
 
The issue of the benefit of negotiating multilaterally rather than bilaterally has been 
addressed by Maggi (1999). Maggi developed a 3 country model, as illustrated in figure 
1 below, in which multilateral bargaining mitigates power imbalances between 
negotiating parties and thereby leads to global welfare improvements. 
 
Figure 1: Multilateral bargaining according to Maggi (1999, p. 196) 
 
 
In figure 1 preferences and endowments are such that each country is a net exporter to 
the country on its right and a net importer from the country on its left. Given this 
situation, each bilateral pairing contains an imbalance of power. For example, country a 
can impose import taxes on country c without risk of commensurate retaliation and thus 
b  c 
a 
  4stands to lose less from a trade war. However, country a faces the opposite situation 
when it engages with country b.  
 
Bilateral Nash bargaining would maximise three separate Nash bargaining Products 
(NBPs) of the form: 
 
  ( )( )
N N
ij ij ij ji ji NBP u u u u =− − (1) 
 
where:   denotes the utility of country i with respect to country j and   denotes the 





Conversely, (assuming symmetry) multilateral bargaining maximises a single NBP 
given as: 
 
  ( )
3 N
Mi M i M NBP u u =−  (2) 
 
where:   is the total utility of country i from trade with both other countries and  iM u
N
iM u  is 
the total utility of country i at the Nash equilibrium.
3
 
In order to highlight the difference between these two approaches it is useful to consider 
the case of extreme power imbalances where, as first argued by Johnson (1953-54), one 
country in each pair will prefer the Nash equilibrium outcome to that of bilateral 
reciprocal free trade. In this situation bilateral bargaining would not lead to free trade. 
However, given that multilateral bargaining maximises global welfare, and thereby 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that this approach to multilateral bargaining implicitly assumes that the WTO 
negotiations are not constrained by the reciprocity rule as it is interpreted by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 
2002), i.e. WTO negotiations do not necessarily maintain world prices. However, whether the reciprocity 
rule as described by Bagwell and Staiger pertains in reality or not is currently an open question (WTO, 
2007). 
  5balances power across all three countries, it would lead to global free trade. Thus 
bilateral bargaining is globally inefficient compared to multilateral bargaining.  
 
By ensuring that all issues are treated as part of a single package that member countries 
either unanimously accept as a whole or do not accept at all, the single-undertaking and 
consensus decision-making principles of the WTO can be thought of as facilitating 
multilateral bargaining as described by Maggi (1999). However, it is important to 
recognise that the global welfare gains afforded by multilateralism in this context only 
arise when there is a ‘balance of imbalances’, i.e. when there are local imbalances in 
power within a globally symmetric system. When one country is more powerful than the 
rest, multilateral bargaining would benefit the weaker parties at the expense of the strong 
party. Hence, the fact that hegemonic countries like the USA have historically chosen to 
fully participate in the WTO system suggests that it yields benefits over and above those 
espoused by Maggi (1999). 
 
2.2  The benefit of negotiating via an institution 
 
An extensive literature exists regarding the myriad ways in which a central institution 
can mitigate the transaction costs associated with negotiating international trade 
agreements. For example, as noted by authors such as Koremenos et al. (2001) and 
Abbott and Snidal (1998), a central institution can provide common support services 
such as translators, the provision of background data, and technical assistance, etc.  An 
institution can also lessen the chance of coordination failure amongst negotiating parties 
by organising and overseeing negotiations according to some pre-established rules 
(Fearon, 1998). Moreover, as argued by Maggi (1999) among others, ceding control to a 
third party mediator can more efficiently settle trade disputes in the presence of 
imperfect information. Indeed the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO, 
  6which serves this purpose, is seen as one of the central pillars of the WTO system 
(WTO, 2007a).
4   
 
Therefore, it may be the case that for large countries, the benefits from negotiating via a 
central institution outweigh the cost of multilateral bargaining, as opposed to bilateral 
bargaining, with respect to less powerful countries. The fact that the original contracting 
parties to the GATT welcomed the accession of smaller countries throughout its near 50 
year history suggests that this is the case. However, the recent proliferation of PTAs 
coupled with deadlocked negotiations in the WTO raises the question of whether the 
stream of developing country accessions that has taken place in recent years has reversed 
this outcome. It is to this question that the analysis now turns. 
 
 3  Model setup 
 
3.1 Basic  setup 
 
The model is an adapted version of the Kennan and Riezman (1990)   endowment 
model with two periods. The current model consists of 
nm ×
1 N +  countries, indexed by an i 
subscript. One country, country a, is a large ‘hub’ which trades with N smaller ‘spoke’ 
countries, n of which are WTO members, indexed by a j subscript, and   of which 
are non-members of the WTO, indexed by a k subscript (country a is itself a WTO 
member). It is assumed that the pattern of trade is such that there is no inter-spoke trade. 
Whilst this is a restrictive assumption, it captures the extreme case of the situation that is 
of interest here: when one country is more concerned about the completion of a 
multilateral trade agreement than the others. Allowing trade between the spoke countries 
would moderate the results of this model quantitatively but not qualitatively and would 
considerably increase the complexity of the following analysis. 
Nn −
 
                                                 
4 See Jackson (1998), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) and Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for further 
discussion of the role of the DSM. 
  7In keeping with Maggi (1999), all bilateral trading relationships are assumed to be 
separable such that trade policies in one relationship do not affect trade flows in other 
relationships, i.e. trade agreements do not cause trade diversion. This assumption 
focuses the analysis on the impact of multilateral versus bilateral bargaining by 
bypassing the possibility of the formation of strategic customs unions (CUs), which, 
whilst being relevant features of reality, are not of particular interest to the current paper. 
Consequently, as illustrated in figure 2 below, country a imports one unique good from 
each spoke country ( JA m  in the case of country j and  KA m  in the case of country k) in 
exchange for one unique good ( AJ m  in the case of country j and  AK m  in the case of 
country k). There are thus 2  goods, indexed by an l superscript.  N
 








All countries share the following utility function: 
 









=∑ i l c
j  k 
× ×  
n  Nn −  
  8where:  il β  denotes country i's preference for good l, and   denotes country i's 
consumption of good l. 
il c
 
Each country is endowed with  il E  of each good. Given the assumed pattern of trade, the 
endowment and taste parameters of the spoke countries equal 0 for all goods except 
those that they exchange with country a. Furthermore, for simplicity, it is assumed that 






al jAJ jJA kAK kKA N
ββ β β β = ==== . 
 
The world endowment of each good is normalised to one such that the world distribution 
of endowments can be summarized as: 
  
  .  1; 1; 1; 1 aJA jJA jAJ aAJ aKA kKA kAK aAK EE EE EE EE =− =− =− =−
 
One further simplifying assumption is used to focus the analysis and to reduce the size 
of expressions: the endowment combination between country a and country j is assumed 
to be the same as that between country a and country k. Thus: 
 
  ; aAJ aAK a jJA kKA N E EE E EE = == = . 
The specific utility function of each country is thus given as: 
 
  () ( log log log log
22
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kk K A uc c =+ ) k A K  (6) 
 




The following analysis is conducted for trade between country a and country j, however, 
at this stage, the results are analogous for trade between country a and country k. 
 
The assumed preference structure implies that the autarchic relative price of good  AJ m , 
in terms of good  JA m  in each country is given as  iAJ iAJ iJA iJA iAJ pP P E E ==. The 
assumption that country a has a comparative advantage in good  AJ m  requires that 
aAJ jAJ p p < , which implies that ( ) ( ) 11 N aN a E EE E −< − . Accordingly, the range of 
possible endowment combinations is given as: 
 
  1 aAJ jJA EE2 < +<  (7) 
 
Each country levies a tariff at the rate  il τ  on its import good. Note that, for convenience, 
it is useful to write this as  1 il il T τ = −  and to use  1 il il T τ = +  when expressing tariffs. 
Given that bilateral relationships are separable, country a sets tariffs with respect to 
country  j  to maximise utility subject to the following relationship-specific budget 
constraint: 
 
  ( ) ( ) 1
WW 1 AJ aAJ aJA aJA AJ a aJA N aJA aJA pc Tc pE T E T i += + − + −  (8) 
 
  10where 
W
AJ p  is the world relative price of good  AJ m  and   is country a’s imports of 
good 
aJA i
JA m  (hence (  represents tariff revenue). Expressions for country a’s 
consumption of goods 
) 1 aJA aJA Ti −
AJ m  and  JA m  are given as: 
 
   (9)  aAJ a aAJ cE e =−
 
   (10)  1 aJA N aJA cE =− + i
 
where   denotes country a’s exports of good  aAJ e AJ m . Substituting (9) and (10) into (8) 




AJa A J a J A pe i =  (11) 
 
Given the assumed preference structure, utility is maximised by allocating equal 
expenditures to each good such that: 
W
AJa A J a J Aa J A pc Tc = . Substituting in expressions (9) 
and (10) yields: 
 











Substituting equation (12) into the trade balance condition given in equation (11) gives 
country a’s offer curve: 
 









= ++  (13) 
 
Similarly, country j sets tariffs to maximise utility subject to the following budget 
constraint: 
  11 
  ( ) ( ) 11
WW W
jJA jAJ AJ jJA N jAJ AJ a jAJ jAJ AJ cT p c E T p E T i p += + − + −  (14) 
 
Expressions for country j’s consumption of goods  AJ m  and  JA m   are given as: 
 
   (15)  jJA N jJA cE e =−
 
   (16)  1 jAJ a jAJ cE =− + i
 





AJj A J j J A p ie =  (17) 
 
As in country a, utility is maximised by allocating equal expenditure to each good such 
that: 
W















Substituting equation (18) into the trade balance condition and rearranging gives country 
j’s offer curve: 
 









= ++  (19) 
 
Utilising the trade balance conditions given in (11) and (17), and the fact that a single 
world price prevails, each country’s offer curve can be solved for world prices: 
  12  ( ) 1
:
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From the trade balance conditions it is clear that country a’s exports must equal country 
j’s imports. Thus, solving expression (21) for imports and substituting into equation (20) 
according to   yields an expression for period 1 world prices in terms of 
endowments and tariffs: 
aAJ jAJ ei =
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Substituting equation (22) into expressions (20) and (21) allows the following 
expressions for exports and imports to be derived: 
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Substituting equations (23) and (24) into equations (9), (10) yields expressions for 
consumption in terms of tariffs and endowments: 
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Utilising the expression for utility given in equations (4) the following expression can 
now be derived for the utility of country a with respect to all its trading partners 
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Similarly, the utility of country j in terms of tariffs and endowments (an analogous 
expression exists for country k) is given as: 
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  143.2  Free trade outcomes 
 
Free trade consumption levels are given by evaluating expressions (25) - (28) given 


















These expressions are utilised later on in the computation of NBPs. 
 
3.3  Nash equilibrium tariffs 
 
In this model, as in Mayer (1981), Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002), 
governments intervene in trade for optimal tariff reasons and duly arrive at a prisoners’ 
dilemma which motivates them to form trade agreements. Reaction functions are 
generated by maximising the expressions for utility given in equations (29) and (30) 
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Solving equations (33) and (34) simultaneously gives the Nash equilibrium tariffs as 
identified by Kennan and Riezman (1988): 
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Substituting equations (35) and (36) into the expressions for consumption given in 
equations (25) - (28) gives Nash consumption levels: 
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 (38) 
 
























































  16Equations (37) - (40) could be used to derive expressions for Nash equilibrium utility in 
terms of endowments and tariffs. However, these, and subsequent expressions, would be 
too cumbersome to present here. Accordingly, utility from here on is simply given in 
terms of consumption. Thus, the utility achieved by countries a and j at the Nash 
equilibrium is given as: 
 
  () ( log log log log
22
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N
j A J c  (42) 
 
As is well established, Nash equilibrium utility is inefficient and can be improved upon 
by mutual liberalisation via a trade agreement. However, such agreements can be formed 
either via the WTO or via a PTA. The following section details the distinction in the 
current setting. 
 
4.  Bilateral versus multilateral trade agreements 
 
In order to capture the benefits of multilateralism in this context it is assumed that deals 
conducted within the WTO are cheaper to establish than bilateral deals. This assumption 
conforms with the literature discussed in section 2.2 regarding the myriad ways in which 
a central institution can mitigate the transaction costs associated with negotiating 
international agreements. However, whilst in reality the WTO certainly confers such 
benefits on its members, negotiations conducted within it tend to take a considerable 
length of time. Indeed, the last time a multilateral trade negotiating round was 
successfully concluded was in 1994 when the Uruguay round came to an end. In 
contrast, over 160 PTAs have been notified to the WTO since 1995 (WTO, 2007a). In 
order to capture this aspect of reality in the current model, it is assumed that WTO 
negotiations take two periods to conclude whereas PTA negotiations can be conducted 
  17within a single period. Accordingly, country a and the n other WTO member countries 
play the following two-period game: 
 











In the first stage countries a and the n other WTO members must decide whether to 
commence multilateral negotiations or to form a web of PTAs. If bilateralism is opted 
for, the game ends and the PTA outcome pertains in both periods. However, if 
multilateralism is chosen, the status quo, i.e. the Nash equilibrium, is maintained for the 
remainder of the period and the game continues on to the second period. In the second 
period there are three possible outcomes: a successfully concluded WTO agreement; a 
web of PTAs; or the maintenance of the Nash equilibrium. Reversion to PTA-based 
negotiation is the threat point during WTO negotiations. The threat point during PTA 
negotiations is, as it was in the first period, maintenance of the Nash equilibrium. Of 
crucial importance is the fact that the veto power afforded by WTO rules means that 
reversion to PTA-based negotiation in a game between country a and any country j 
,
PPP P
an j VV   ,
NW NW
an j VV  ,
NN NN
an j VV  
WTO Nash  PTA
,
NP NP
an j VV  
  18causes a reversion to PTA-based negotiation in all games between country a and its 
trading partners. 
 
Note that the payoffs in figure 2 are given in terms of  , which represents inter-
temporal utility. In the present scenario, discounting of the future would temper the 
outcomes quantitatively but have no qualitative effect. Hence, to facilitate a 
parsimonious exposition, inter-temporal utility is simply given as the sum of the utilities 
obtained in each period: 
i V
 
  ii VuU i = +  (43) 
 
where   denotes the utility obtained by country i in period 2.  i U
 
The superscripts refer to the outcome in each period, for example, the superscript NW 
refers to Nash equilibrium in period 1 and a WTO agreement in period 2. In either 
period, the game between country a and the Nn −  WTO non-members is simply that of 
bilateral PTA negotiation. The crucial question is whether an increasing WTO 
membership augments or diminishes the welfare benefit of forming a multilateral trade 
agreement, i.e. what is the effect of a rising value of n on 
NWP
ii VV −
P . This question is 
addressed in the following sections.  
 
4.1  Second period PTA bargaining  
 
PTA negotiations are the outside option for all parties to multilateral negotiations. Thus, 
in order to compute the outcome of multilateral bargaining, it is first necessary to 
evaluate the outcome of the bilateral negotiations that would occur in the event of their 
collapse. Utilising the approach of Mclaren (1997) and Epifani and Vitaloni (2006), the 
Nash bargaining solution (NBS) involves countries going to free trade with a transfer, S, 
between the party that favours free trade the most and the party that favours it the least. 
  19However, in order to capture the notion that the WTO yields benefits over and above 
those obtained from bilateral bargaining, it is assumed that some portion of trade is lost 
during PTA negotiations, which is not lost during WTO negotiations. Thus, countries 
cannot achieve free trade from a PTA; a portion,θ , of the difference between Nash 
equilibrium and free trade levels of trade are lost. Accordingly, exports and imports 
under PTA-diminished free trade are given as: 
 
  ( )
FF FN
iii i eee e
θ θ =− −  (44) 
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θ θ =− −  (45) 
 
In the second period PTA, Nash equilibrium is the outside option, thus the Nash 
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θ  is the welfare that country a achieves from PTA-diminished free trade 
with respect to country j holding trade with all other  1 N −  of its trading partners 
constant at the Nash equilibrium: 
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  20Maximising the NBP with respect to  yields: 
P S
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Given the assumption of symmetry between country a’s trading partners, the transfer 
between country a and country j is of the same magnitude as that between country a and 
country k. Consequently, the utility obtained by all 3 country types can be given as: 
 
   (50) 
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jk j UUU S
θ P = =+  (51) 
 
4.2  Second period WTO bargaining 
 
WTO negotiations differ from PTA negotiations in several ways. Firstly, by assumption, 
they yield benefits over and above PTA negotiations; captured here by the absence of 
the diminishing variable, θ , during WTO negotiations. Secondly, the outside option 
during WTO negotiations is the welfare that countries would obtain via PTA 
negotiations. Thus parties to the WTO bargain over the benefit of negotiating via the 
WTO relative to negotiating a web of PTAs. Thirdly, given that bargaining is 
multilateral, the outside option of country a during WTO negotiations is not simply a 
reversion to PTA negotiations with respect to a single country, but a reversion to PTA 
negotiations with respect to all countries. Consequently, all n WTO members that trade 
with country a have significant bargaining power during WTO negotiations.  
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  21where   is the welfare that country a achieves from free trade with respect to all n 
WTO members, holding trade with the 
F
an U
Nn −  WTO non-member countries constant at 
PTA levels: 
  
  () () () log log log log
22
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Maximising the NBP with respect to   yields: 
W S
 











The utility of WTO members following multilateral negotiations can thus be given as: 
 
 
   (55) 
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The welfare of the   WTO non-members remains unchanged at that which they 
achieve from PTA negotiations. 
Nn −
 
4.3  Bilateralism versus multilateralism in the first period 
 
If WTO members decide not to participate in multilateral negotiations, the PTA outcome 
will pertain in both periods such that inter-temporal welfare is given as: 
 
   (57)  2
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If WTO member countries do decide to engage in multilateral negotiations, they must 
accept that the bargaining process requires a period to complete; thus the Nash 
equilibrium pertains for the first period. Accordingly, the inter-temporal welfare of 
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an u  denotes the utility that country a achieves from remaining at the Nash 
equilibrium with respect to all n WTO member countries, but negotiating PTAs with all 
 WTO non-members. This is given as:  Nn −
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From the above analysis, it is clear that the utility of countries a and j  are determined by 




P  for various values of n ( 15 0 n = K ) yields multiple 
different outcomes depending on the values chosen for endowments and θ . In order to 
restrict attention to scenarios more likely to correspond with reality, country a is 
assumed not to be smaller than country j in all simulations. This conforms with the 
notion that country a is a large developed ‘hub’ that trades with multiple developing 
country ‘spokes’.  One important case is used as a benchmark and discussed in section 
  235.1 below: when country a chooses to negotiate multilaterally when WTO membership 
is low but chooses to negotiate bilaterally when membership expands too much. Section 
5.2 then discusses how this benchmark changes with variations in endowments and θ .  
 
5.1  Benchmark case: multilateralism collapses as WTO membership expands 
 
The benchmark case is illustrated in figure 4 below:  
 
Figure 4: Multilateralism versus bilateralism for countries a and j given: 
0.9, 0.2, 50, 0.9 aN EEN θ = == =  
 
 
From figure 4 it is clear that, when country a is larger than country j, country a’s utility 
from multilateralism relative to bilateralism is parabolic with respect to n. Hence, for 
country a, there is an optimal number of WTO member countries. If accession continues 
past this point, the benefit country a obtains from negotiating multilaterally declines and 
  24eventually becomes negative. On the other hand, each country j benefits from expanding 
WTO membership but at a declining rate. 
 
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Each acceding country shifts out the 
multilateral bargaining frontier because of the utility it, and country a, gain from 
negotiating multilaterally rather than bilaterally. However, the total gains must then be 
spread amongst the existing membership plus the acceding country. Thus, as the 
membership grows, the extra gains brought by an acceding country must be spread 
increasingly thinly. For country a, and each country j, second period utility from 
multilateralism is diminishing with respect to n. However, for country a, each acceding 
country entails a further loss in the first period relative to bilateralism because it must 
endure the lower Nash equilibrium welfare for that period. 
 
Given that, without country a’s consent, a WTO accord will not be reached, it is clear 
that, once WTO membership has expanded too much, multilateralism will collapse and 
bilateralism will prevail; as appears to be occurring in reality. 
 
Note that the y-axis intercept in figure 4 represents the relative value of multilateralism 
when there is only one spoke country. If the single-undertaking and consensus decision-
making principles were not applied, then this would be the utility country a would attain 
from the accession of each new WTO member. Given that utility is also positive for 
country j at the intercept, it is clear that, in this admittedly highly stylised scenario, were 
negotiations within the WTO to be conducted purely bilaterally, then country a would 
embrace WTO negotiations and global welfare gains would result. 
 
5.2  Other scenarios 
 
As noted above, utility is dependent upon endowments, the cost of a PTA and the 
number of WTO members. Varying the cost of a PTA shifts the positions of the curves 
vertically: a higher value of θ  causes the curves to shift upwards; a lower value causes 
  25the curves to shift downwards. It is thus possible to construct examples where 
multilateralism is always rejected by country a, always rejected by both countries, and 
always accepted by both countries. However, the basic intuition remains: multilateralism 
is more likely to be rejected at higher levels of WTO membership. 
 
Altering the relative sizes of countries a and j does not change the basic intuition either; 
it simply alters the optimum number of WTO members for country a. The closer 
countries a and j are in size, the lower the optimum membership for country a and hence 





By constructing a more realistic model of multilateral trade negotiations than has 
previously been ventured, the above analysis has highlighted that, under certain 
circumstances, an expanding WTO membership can lead to a collapse in multilateral 
negotiations because of the veto power afforded to member countries under WTO 
jurisprudence. The circumstances under which this situation arises are akin to those 
currently prevailing in the WTO: when large ‘hub’ countries deal with smaller ‘spoke’ 
countries; when WTO agreements yield benefits relative to a web of PTAs; and, when 
the conclusion of WTO negotiations is time-consuming. Moreover, the current model 
shows that, were the veto power of countries to be removed, global welfare gains could 
be attained through the successful conclusion of WTO negotiations. 
 
It is important to highlight an important caveat: the pattern of trade assumed in this 
model negates the benefits of multilateralism as described by Maggi (1999). Whilst this 
served to highlight the deleterious effect of the single-undertaking and consensus 
decision-making principles, it is necessary to temper advocacy of removal of these 
principles with the realisation that the issue-linkages they facilitate can be beneficial. 
However, some halfway measures have been proposed. For example, Sutherland et al. 
(2004, p. 64) suggest that: 
  26“a Member considering blocking a measure which otherwise has very broad consensus 
support shall only block such consensus if it declares in writing, with reasons included, 
that the matter is of vital importance to it”. 
 
This proposal would dissuade countries from attempting to capture the gains that other 
countries obtain from multilateralism relative to regionalism and would thereby assuage 
the pessimistic prognosis of the model in this paper. More extreme proposals have been 
ventured that suggest that ‘variable geometry’ be introduced into the WTO, i.e. relaxing 
the single-undertaking restriction and thereby making the WTO an umbrella institution 
circumscribing a range of ‘plurilateral’ agreements, participation in which would be on a 
purely voluntary basis.
5 According to proponents of this approach, variable geometry 
would allow coalitions of the willing to proceed unhindered by the objections of others 
and thus impasse would be less likely to arise. Cornford (2004), Sutherland et al. (2004) 
and Lawrence (2006) note that variable geometry is not without historical precedent in 
the multilateral trade negotiating system. For example, the Tokyo round of the GATT 
established a number of ‘codes’ covering issues such as ‘trade in civil aircraft’, the 
‘arrangement on bovine meat’ and the ‘agreement on government procurement’ (AGP) 
which were undertaken voluntarily. Lawrence (2006) suggests that a similar approach be 
adopted in the WTO as was utilised in the AGP. Thus, all members would be free to 
negotiate agreements but ratification would be on a voluntary basis. To avoid free-
riding, he suggests that non-signatories do not receive the benefits of the agreement. The 







                                                 
5 Authors subscribing to this approach include: Cornford (2004), Hufbauer (2005), Messerlin (2005),  and 
Lawrence (2006), etc. Moreover, whilst cognisant of the potential benefits of variable geometry, 
Sutherland et al. (2004) temper their advocacy with concerns about the practicality of its implementation. 
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